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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16 Noah Duguid, on behalf of himself and all
17 others similarly situated,
18

Plaintiff,

19
20

vs.

21 Facebook, Inc.,
22

Defendant.

3:15-cv-985
Case No.: _________________

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF THE
TELEPHONE CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227,
ET SEQ.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

23
24
25
26
27
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1

For his Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff, Noah Duguid, by and through his

2 undersigned counsel, pleading on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly
3 situated, states as follows:
4
5

INTRODUCTION
1.

Plaintiff, Noah Duguid (“Plaintiff”), brings this class action for damages

6 resulting from the illegal actions of Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook” or “Defendant”).
7 Defendant negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully sent unauthorized automated text
8 messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer
9 Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (the “TCPA”).
10

2.

Wireless spam is a growing problem in the United States. In April 2012,

11 the Pew Research Center found that 69% of texters reported receiving unwanted spam
12 text messages, while 25% reported receiving spam texts weekly.
13 http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited
14 November 6, 2014); see also Nicole Perlroth, Spam Invades a Last Refuge, the
15 Cellphone, N.Y.Times, April 8, 2012, at A1 (“In the United States, consumers received
16 roughly 4.5 billion spam texts [in 2011], more than double the 2.2 billion received in
17 2009 . . . .”).
18
3.
Facebook operates an online social network. Facebook’s market value
19 reportedly exceeds $200 billion. Facebook had 864 million daily active users and 1.35
20 billion monthly active users as of September, 2014.
21
4.
Consumers often share private information on Facebook. As an “extra
22 security feature,” Facebook can send “login notifications” to alert users when their
23 account is accessed from a new device (computer, smart-phone, tablet, etc.). Facebook
24 describes the login notifications as follows: “When you turn on login notifications,
25 we’ll send you an alert each time someone logs into your account from a new place.”
26 See Exhibit A. Login notifications can be sent to mobile telephones. See Exhibit A.
27

5.

Login notifications in the form of text messages are often sent to the

28
2

DUGUID CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case3:15-cv-00985-JSC Document1 Filed03/03/15 Page3 of 12

1 cellular telephones of people who have not authorized Facebook to contact them on
2 their cell phones, who have requested that the notifications stop, and, still more
3 egregious, to the phones of people who do not use Facebook whatsoever. These text
4 messages state: “Your Facebook account was accessed from [internet browser] at
5 [time]. Log in for more info.” Consumers can receive these unwanted text messages
6 several times a day.
7

6.

Facebook provides instructions on its website to deactivate the login

8 notification feature. However, these instructions only address stopping the messages
9 by changing a Facebook user’s account settings. See Exhibit B. Facebook offers no
10 solution for those receiving the messages despite having no Facebook account.
11
7.
Online blogs indicate that consumers can also respond “off” to
12 Facebook’s text messages to get them to stop. See Exhibit C. Indeed, Facebook
13 responds to such texts with messages stating: “Facebook texts are now off. Reply on
14 to turn back on.” See Exhibits C & D. However, Facebook often disregards
15 consumers’ requests to stop the login notifications. Rather than cease as instructed,
16 Facebook continues to knowingly hound consumers with unwanted and unauthorized
17 text messages. See Exhibits C & D. As one Facebook user complained, “I have tried
18 texting ‘Off’ ‘OFF’ ‘off” ‘STOP’ ‘Stop’. NONE of them have stopped the text
19 messages. If I get one more text message from Facebook I will delete the whole
20 account.” Exhibit C.
21
8.
Servicing over a billion Facebook accounts worldwide, Facebook’s
22 automated systems are powerful and, when used improperly, capable of extreme
23 invasions into the privacy of American consumers. See Exhibit C (consumer
24 complaining of receiving text messages from Facebook “at all hours of the night”).
25 Facebook operates a sloppy system and in doing so shows complete disregard for the
26 privacy of consumers.
27

9.

Plaintiff is such a consumer and he seeks relief for himself and all others

28
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1 similarly situated from Facebook’s unlawful behavior.
2
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3

10.

This Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

4 § 1331. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Serv., LLC, 132 S.Ct. 740, 751-53 (2012).
5
11. Jurisdiction in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),
6 as Plaintiff seeks at least $500 in damages for each violation of the TCPA, which when
7 aggregated among a proposed class numbering more than a thousand members,
8 exceeds the $5,000,000.00 threshold for federal court jurisdiction. Plaintiff also
9 alleges a national class which will result in at least one class member residing in a
10 different state.
11
12. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because
12 Defendant resides in this District and because a substantial part of the events giving
13 rise to the claim occurred in this District.
14
15

PARTIES
13.

Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an adult individual

16 residing in Stevensville, Montana, and is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39).
17
14. Facebook is a California business entity with an address of 1601 Willow
18 Road, Menlo Park, California 94025, and is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §
19 153(39).
20

THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991

21

15.

The TCPA regulates, among other things, the use of automated telephone

22 dialing systems (“ATDS”).
23
16. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) defines an ATDS as equipment having the
24 capacity–
25
(A)

to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or

26

sequential number generator; and

27

(B)

to dial such numbers.

28
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1

17.

Specifically, 47 U.S.C. § 227(1)(A)(iii) prohibits any call using an ATDS

2 to a cellular phone without prior express consent by the person being called, unless the
3 call is for emergency purposes.
4

18.

The FCC has clarified that text messages qualify as “calls” under the

5 TCPA:
We affirm that under the TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an
6
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message to
7
any wireless telephone number. Both the statute and our rules prohibit these
calls, with limited exceptions, “to any telephone number assigned to a paging
8
service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other
9
common carrier service, or any service for which the party is charged.” This
encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for
10
example, short message service (SMS) calls, provided the call is made to a
11
telephone number assigned to such service.
12 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
13 1991, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (July 3, 2003); see Satterfield v.
14 Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).
15

19.

“Prior express written consent” means that there must be a written

16 agreement, signed by the person receiving the call or text, with a “clear and
17 conspicuous disclosure” that specifically authorizes the seller to send telemarketing
18 communications using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
19 prerecorded voice. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.
20
21

ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS
20.

On or around January 25, 2014, Facebook began placing text messages to

22 Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, 406-xxx-7935.
23
21. Facebook placed the text messages from number 326-65 (spelling
24 FBOOK), an abbreviated telephone number known as an SMS short code licensed and
25 operated by Defendant or one of its agents on its behalf.
26
27
28
5
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1

22.

Facebook placed repeated text messages to the Plaintiff. A true and

2 correct copy of several of the messages received by Plaintiff are produced below:
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

23.

Facebook obtained Plaintiff’s telephone number through unknown means.

18

24.

At no time did Plaintiff ever provide his cellular telephone number to

19 Facebook.
20

25.

At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with

21 Facebook.
22

26.

At no time did Plaintiff provide Facebook prior written consent for it to

23 send text messages to his cellular phone.
24

27.

Further, on or around April 20, 2014, Plaintiff sent Facebook a detailed

25 email complaining of the unauthorized text messages to his cell phone and requesting
26 that the text messages cease. In response, Facebook sent Plaintiff an automated email
27 directing Plaintiff to log on to the Facebook website to report problematic “content.”
28
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1 Plaintiff responded to the email by re-explaining his issue and stating: “A human needs
2 to read this email and take action. Thank you!” In response, Facebook sent the same
3 automated email as received in response to the first email. See Exhibit E.
4
28. Still further, on October 18, 2014, Plaintiff responded to a text messages
5 from Facebook with the word “off.” Facebook responded: “Facebook texts are now
6 off. Reply on to turn them back on.” However, the very same day, Facebook sent
7 Plaintiff another text message. Plaintiff once again responded “off” and “all off.”
8 Again, Facebook responded: “Facebook texts are now off. Reply on to turn them back
9 on.” Again, still in the same day, Facebook sent Plaintiff another text message. See
10 Exhibit D.
11

29.

The text messages sent to Plaintiff’s cellular phone were made with an

12 ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
13
30. The ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be
14 called, using a random or sequential number generator.
15
31. The telephone number messaged by Facebook was assigned to a cellular
16 telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs charges for incoming messages pursuant to
17 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).
18

32.

The messages from Facebook to Plaintiff were not placed for “emergency

19 purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).
20
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
21 A. The Class
22
33. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on
23 behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.
24

34.

25

Class 1: All persons within the United States who did not provide
their cellular telephone number to Defendant and who received
one or more text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant to said
person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any

26
27

Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes:

28
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to
the filing of the Complaint.
Class 2: All persons within the United States who, after notifying
Defendant that it no longer wished to receive text messages and
receiving a confirmation from Defendant to that effect, received
one or more text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant to said
person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any
automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to
the filing of the Complaint.
35.

Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes.

Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the class
members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be
certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter.
36.

This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of

economic injury on behalf of the Classes, and it expressly is not intended to request
any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right
to modify or expand the Class definitions to seek recovery on behalf of additional
persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery.
B. Numerosity
37.

Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent text messages to cellular

telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States
without their prior express consent. The members of the Classes, therefore, are
believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
38.

The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this

time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class
members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records.
C. Common Questions of Law and Fact
39.

There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that

predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These
questions include:
8
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1

a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff

2

and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;

3

b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained

4

prior express consent to send each message;

5

c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful;

6

d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such

7

damages; and

8

e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the

9
10

future.
40.

The common questions in this case are capable of having common

11 answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely sends automated text messages
12 to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services without prior express
13 consent is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable
14 of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.
15 D. Typicality
16
41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they
17 are all based on the same factual and legal theories.
18 E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members
19
42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and
20 has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving
21 unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which
22 might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.
23 F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable
24
43. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication
25 of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the
26 prosecutions of separate claims against Facebook is small because it is not
27 economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions.
28
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1

44.

Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties.

2 Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions. These cases include, but are not
3 limited to: Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski
4 v. Med1 Online, LLC, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V.
5 Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European
6 Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012).
7
COUNT I
Violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act,
47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq .

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

45.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and

incorporates them herein by reference.
46.

Defendant sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers

belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express
consent.
47.

Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a violation

of the TCPA.
48.

Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory

damages for each message sent in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(3)(B).
49.

Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive

relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.

22

COUNT II
Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

23
24
25
26
27
28

50.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and

incorporates them herein by reference.
51.

Defendant knowingly and/or willfully sent multiple automated text
10
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1 messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the
2 Classes without their prior express consent.
3

52.

Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a knowing

4 and/or willful violation of the TCPA.
5
53. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA,
6 Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for
7 each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C.
8 § 227(b)(3)(C).
9
54. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive
10 relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.
11
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
12

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court grant Plaintiff and the Classes

13 the following relief against Defendant as follows:
14
1. Injunctive relief prohibiting such violations of the TCPA by Defendant
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

in the future;
2. Statutory damages of $500.00 for each and every call in violation of the
TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B);
3. Treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call in violation
of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C);
4. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs to counsel for Plaintiff and the
Classes; and
5. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

23
24

TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED ON ALL COUNTS

25
26
27
28
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1 DATED: March 3, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Trinette Kent
Trinette Kent, Esq. (Bar No. 222020)
Lemberg Law, LLC
Attorney for Plaintiff, Noah Duguid
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